I. New Books.
Royce, Josiah, Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. The World and the Individual. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1900 -pp. XVI, 588. -This volume is composed of the first series of Gifford Lectures delivered by the author before the University of Aberdeen in 1898. A second series of lectures was delivered by Professor Royce in the following year, and will shortly appear äs a separate volume fresh point of view of this most fundamental and altimate problem. Our concern, however, is more directly with the main portion of the book, which falls into four divisions, dealing respectively with what the author calls the four historical conceptions of reality. These four conceptions, which are taken up in order, are Realism, Mysticism, The Standpoint of Validity (which the author identifies with that of the Kr. d. r. V.), and the author's own theory. This latter has nowhere Ithink, a name affixed to it, but it belongs to the general Hegelian type, and may perhaps be called "Objective Idealism". The main significance of the work arises frora the fact that the author has made a deliberate attempt to find a place for Will in his synthesis, and thus to obviate the objection so often brought against theories of this type, that they are abstractly logical and yield no principle of individuation. On this point he says in his preface: "In my first book the conception of the Absolute was defined in such wise äs led me to prefer, quite deliberately, the use of the tenn "Thought 1 äs the best name for the final unity of the Absolute. While this term was there so defined äs to make Thought inclusive of Will and of Experience, these latter terms were not emphasized prominently enough, and the aspects of the Absolute Life which they denote have since become more central in my own interests. The present is a deliberate effort to bring into synthesis, more fully than I have ever done before, the *elations of Knowledge and of Will in our conception of God u (p. IX). We cannot here follow the author's discussion and criticism of Realism, Mysticism, and Validity, äs answers to the question regarding the nature of Being. I wish to remark, however, that his representation of Mysticism äs absolute subjectivism does not seem historically justifiable, and also, äs Paulsen has shown, that Kant's doctrine of "mögliche Erfahrung" is by no means to be taken äs representative of his ontological conception of reality.
In working out his own theory, Royce Starts, like Kant, from experience. "To inquire regarding the nature of an idea and its true relation to Reality is to attack the world problem in the way which promises most for success". Indeed, this is the central problem of the whole work, and the author's metaphysical views follow directly from his theory of the nature of the idea and its relation to its object. Intelligent ideas, we are told, belong rather to the motor side of life than to the merely sensory; they always involve a consciousness of how we propose to act towards the things of which we have ideas. "By the word Jdea* ... I shall mean in the end any state of consciousness, simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed äs at least the partial embodiment or expression of a single conscious purpose" (pp. 22, 23) . Besides this internal purpose, which is regarded äs primary and essential, an idea always has an external meaning, in that it refers beyond itself to an bbject. Now the course of Royce's argument may be described äs a dialectical movement by means of which he unites the internal purpose of the idea with what appears to be its external significance Or, more precisely expressed, the argument is directed to show that the reference of the idea to an external object is simply the necessary completion and development of the internal meaning -an appeal from an ihcomplete and partially understood purpose to its complete embodiment and realization in an Absolute Experience.
This argument is worked out with great skill, and although the final conclusion appears to the writer to be reached by a tour de force, the. discussion must be recognized äs of great importance because of the freshness and originality of the method that it employs.
In my last report I discussed Professor G. T. Ladd's Philosophy of Knowledge. Since'that time the same author has added to his systematic writings a metaphysical treatise: A Theory of Reality. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899 --pp. XV, 656. -Professor Ladd is the only American writer who has undertaken to treat all branches of philosophy in an extended System. In 1887 he began this work with the publication of his Elements of Physiological Psychology. This was followed a few years later by Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory t The Philosophy of Mind, and The Philosophy of Knowledge. In the concluding chapter of the work before us, the author gives a summary of the conclusions that, he has already obtained, and intimates that to complete his System there are still necessary investigations in Ethics, Aesthetics, and the Philosophy of Religion.
The fundamental positions of The Theory of Reality were already outiined in the author's earlier books; but they are here elaborated at length and rendered much more complete and systematic. In many respects this seems to me the best of Ladd's systematic works and itdoes much to bring into relation and to render more significant the discussions of the preceeding volumes. The general type of philosophy here presented to us is closely akin to that of Lotze, though the method of investigation is quite independent, and the discussions have quite a different startingpoint. But, like Lotze, the author protests against the absoluteness of the Kantian distinction between phenomena and things in themselves, main" taining that knowledge of reality is necessarily implicated in a knowledge of appearance. The iesult of the final synthesis that he reaches is an Idealistic Monism -the unity of all things in an Absolute Life that is not a blank identity, but still (äs the author maintains) leaves room for the variety and true reality of individual existence. Furthermore, in agreement with Lotze, he holds that this relation of the Absolute to the particulars embraced under it can be most adequately conceived in analogy with that of the knowing and willing seif to the manifold of ideas and conscious content that constitute the mental life. -The author teils us that the view of the world that is here presented äs the result of metaphysical reflection is by no means complete in all its details. It is only to be regarded äs an outline to be filled in by further inquiries into the domains of Ethics, Aesthetics, and the Philosophy of Religion.
Another important and extensive work is from the pen of a Princeton professor of phüosophy: Foundations of Knowledge. By A. T. Ormond. New York, The Macmillan Company, London, Macmillan & Co. 1900 -pp. XXVH, 528 . This book is dedicated to the memory of James MC Cosh, who was for many years the most prominent representative of Scottish philosophy in America. The author, however, has been greatly influenced by German thought, and especially by the philosophy of Kant. Indeed, the book may perhaps be described äs an attempt'to establish the main results of the Scottish philosophy by adopting the method of Criticism, while rejecting the negative conclusions of Kant T s epistemology. The book, however, is much more than a discussion of old problems along traditional lines. The author's discussions are always fresh and vigorous, he is in sympathy with modern scientific investigation, and at the same time displays genuine speculative insight in his grasp of the significance of facts and theories. I quote a passage from the Preface which calls attention to what the author regards äs the most Import an t features of the book. "One of the points insisted on äs cardinal is the place assigned to the notion and function of experience. That knowledge is an intra-experiental tenn, and that philosophy must be an Interpretation of experience in the broad sense, are taken to be propositions that are not open to serious dispute. Again, the doctrine of the internal complexity of being must be regarded äs one of fundamental importance. For if being is conceived to be in the last analysis internally simple and structureless, it follows that it will be opaque to Knowledge and that philosophy must give it up in despair . . . Furthermore, this doctrine of internal complexity supplies a point of view from which the subject and object distinction in consciousness becomes primary, and on this basis is developed what is doubtless one of the principal features of the book; namely, the distinction of the subjective and objective consciousness of the absolute and the relating of the absolute through its objective consciousness, in a constitutive way, to the world of finite individuals. That the objective consciousness of the absolute is constitutionally individuating, in the sense developed in the discussions, is taken to be a truth of cardinal importance f or philosophy, in äs much äs it supplies a non-partizan principle on which both the individual and the universal may be conserved" (pp. XXV, XXVI).
This passage may serve also to illustrate how close is the connection of epistemology and metaphysics in the author's thought. The problems of being are never lost sight of in the discussions regarding the nature of knowledge. In my opinion this is a merit rather than a defect in Professor Ormond's work. For if we do not accept the distinction .between phenomenon and reality äs absolute (and in America this seems to most philosophical scholars an überwundener Standpunkt), we must say that all knowledge reveals, more or less directly, the nature of reality. Since, tlien, the process and the object of knowledge are always in close and necessary connection, i t is vain to investigate the former in entire abstraction from the latter. Of course no good can result from confusion, from failure to distinguish different points of view. But the absolute barrenness of much modern investigation into the theory of knowledge has been the result of an anxiety to avoid metaphysics, which has led to the treatment of knowledge äs a subjective process, and to the neglect of its necessary ontological iroplications.
Besides the tliree large and systematic works already described, it is necessary to mention briefly a number of smaller works which are related, more or less directly, to the phüosophy of Kant. The first of these is by the well-known German writer who is now professor of psychology at Harvard TJniversity. Psychology and Life. By Hugo Münsterberg. Boston and New York. Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1899 -pp. XIV, 286. Of the six papers which make up the contents of this book, all except one had previously been published äs separate articles in various American periodicals. They have all to do with the relations and applications of psychology, and bear the following titles: "Psychology and Life"; "Psychology and Physiology"; "Psychology and Education"; "Psychology and Art"; "Psychology and History"; "Psychology and Mysticism". The last essay, Psychology and Mysticism, is a vigorous attack upon the aims and method of the Society for Psychical Research, against setting out with the assumption that certain phenomena are mystical and supernormal,, and therefore cannot be explained according to the ordinary canons of scientific investigation. The paper entitled, Psychology and Education, is also a protest against a tendency which the author has perceived in American schools and Colleges, to turn to psychology in the utilitarian spirit, with the conviction that it furnishes an account of the nature of the mind, and will, therefore, be directly serviceable in educational work.
The main interest of the book, however, consists in the sharp dividing-line which the author draws between the results of psychological description and the real mental life. A sentence or two from thePreface will serve to indicate the general standpoint which the author has sometimes connected with the names of Kant and Fichte. "These papers endeavour to show that psychology is not at all an expression of reality, but a complicated transformation of it, worked out for special logicalpurposes in the Service of our life. Psychology is thus a special abstract construction which has a right to consider everything from its own important standpoint, but vhich has nothing to assert in regard to the Interpretation and appreciation of our real freedom and duty, our real values and ideals. ... A scientific synthesis of the ethical idealism with the physiological psychology of our days is thus my purpose" (p. VII).
-The method of reaching a synthesis by the simple device of dividing the field is a favorite solution of many difficult problems at the present time, Professor Münsterberg has stated this position so clearly and frankly in regard to psychology and the real mental life, that renewed attention has been directed to both the strength and the weakness of the general doctrine that separates so completely scientific ,constructions' from the real truth regarding reality. In the first volume of his Grundzüge der Psycliologie (Leipzig, 1900) the author has presented the same views in an elaborated form to the German public, so that further discussion of his book of English essays is here unnecessary.
The theory of imitation has played a prominent part in recent psychological and sociological discussions, and in the next book on my list we have an attempt to apply this concept to the theory of knowledge. , 340. It is "one of the main objects of the present work u , the author teils ns, "to show that what is now offered äs science is nottruth; that science, physical, mental, moral, philosophical, is not truth; that no science singly can give it, and that all together fail. It is then to be shown that for the attainment of truth a new method must be developed" (p. 11). This new method of attaining truth, when dealing with the not-self, is by reproducing through sympathetic Imitation, a copy or likeness of what is to be known. "Since in the effort to know the mind seeks to think things äs they are in themselves, and since the facts to be known by a human being are the knowing seif and a world of other persons and things, knowledge maybe defined äs the presence in the mind immediately, or in copy, of that which constitutes oljects" (p. 35). Professor Smith then proceeds to show that knowledge by means of concepts, which is the method of both science and philosophy, fails to realize the demands of this definition. For concepts are only universals, and knowledge of concrete facts cannot be embodied in universals. It does not, however, follow that knowledge from concepts has no significance at all. In addition to their practical utility, concepts form an indispensable Instrument of knowledge. Indeed, the true method of knowledge results from a "synthesis of the methods", the determination of concepts and laws, which are merely an expression of relations of coexistence and succession, being the necessary propaideutic to the real Interpretation through -sympathetic Imitation. "The phenomenon must be studied, in order that that of which it is the phenomenon may be revealed. As a man studies the face of another that he may have sympathy, so it must always be in the cognition of things . . . There must be this synthesis of the methods that the ideal of knowledge may be reached. The sympathy which finds such striking Illustration in the artist and the moralist must be joined to the love of observation for its own sake, and the fidelity in the search for facts, which characterize science" (pp. 243-4).
There can be no doubt that the author has here called attention to an important aspect of the process of knowing. It seems to me,however, that both bis definition of knowledge and his treatment of the concepts äs an abstract universal are open to serious criticism. These points are so fundamental that it is impossible here to develop this criticism at length. But it is surely evident that the ,copy c theory of Knowledge is attended by serious difficulties, and that when we forsake concepts and take refuge in the immediate experiences attained through sympathy, we thereby abandon the possibility of any objective Standard of truth. Sympathetic Imitation may afford experiences which serve äs valuable data for knowledge, but can never furnish the final and objective form of truth. . Among recent works on Ethics, I shall only mention in passing Professor Thilly's clearly and ably written text-book. Introduction to Ethics. By Frank Thilly. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900 -pp. XI, 346. The book is dedicated to Professor Paulsen, and repressent the same general standpoint äs that of the latter's System der Ethik, which had previously been translated into English by Thilly. It contains much valuable historical matter, and frequent appreciative references to the ethical doctrines of Kant, though the author rejects intuitionism and absolutism, and treats ethics from the teleological point of view.
Kant and Spencer. A Study of the Fallacies of Agnosticism. By Paul Carns. Chicago. The Open Court Publishing Company, 1899 -pp. 105. This little work consists of four papers reprinted from the Monist, with the following titles: "The Ethics of Kant"; "Kant on Evolution"; "Mr. Spencer's Agnosticism"; "Mr. Spencer's Comment and the Author's Reply". This latter paper reproduces the remarks made by Mr. Spencer in a footnote (which refer in part to Mr. Carus's previous criticism) when republishing in 1891 his article on the "Ethics of Kant" (which first appeared in the Populär Science Monthly, August 1888) in the volumes entitled Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative. Carus, indefending Kant from Spencer's attacks, shows convincingly that the latter knows nothing of Kant. This will not seem surprising to those who have read Spencer's works with care. Spencer is äs innocent of any real acquaintance with the history of philosophy äs the great German evolutionist Haeckel (whose wonderful Welträtsel has found a translator in America). In this connection it may be worth transcribing a few sentences from Mr. Spencer's own statement regarding his knowledge ofKant. This statement is found in the footnote to which I have already referred: "My knowledge of Kant's writings is extremely limited. In 1844 a translation of his "Critique of Pure Reason" (then I think lately published) feil into my hands, and I read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine of Time and Space: my peremptory rejection of which caused me to lay the book down. Twice since then the same thing has happened; for, being an impatient reader, when I disagree with the cardinal propositions of a work I can go no further. One other thing Iknew. By indirect references I was made aware that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies have been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend".
Since my last report two treatises of Kant have been translated into English, the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, and the Träume eines Geistersehers. The translation of the former work is included in a volume entitled KanYs Oosmogony (1900) by Professor W. Hastie of the University of Glasgow. As this belongs to English, rather than to American literature, I shall only remark that the Introduction and appendixes added by the translator are extremely valuable, and thrqw much light upon Kant's activity in the field of the natural sciences. -The Träume has been translated into clear and readable English by Emanuel F. Goerwitz, and edited with introduction and notes by Frank Sewall (London and New York, 1900) . The editor is a clergyman of the Swedenborgian or ,New* church, and is evidentiy anxious to emphasize the relation between Kant's thought and that of Swedenborg. After mentioning works by Vaihinger, Heinze, von Lind, and du Prel, in which this relation is discussed, he remarks: "In these investigations it comes to light that not only did Kant find in Sweden-borg system of spiritual philosophy so parallel to that of the philosophers in reasonableness that the validity of the one could be measured by that of the other, but that the very system finally followed by Kant hiraself when he came, later in life, äs a lecturer in the University on Psychology and Metaphysics, to enter npon the domain of these inquiries, was largely identical with that of the "Dreams" he had once affected to be amnsed at" (p. IX). Notwithstanding this summing up, the remarks, which are printed a few pages further on, would hardly seem to justify the claim that the investigators quoted regard the Systems äs "largely identical", in any ordinarily accepted meaning of this phrase. The editor also adds two appendixes. The first of these contains a citation of those passages from Swedenborg by which the leading affirmations of Kant's Dissertation and University Lectures were evidently suggested, or with which they stand in interesting relation (p. XI). In the second appendix is found a translation of Kant's letter on Swedenborg to Charlotte von Knobloch.
Dick, S. M. The Principle of Synthetic ünity in Berkeley and Kant. Lowell, Mass., 1898 -pp« VII, 82. This monograph was presented some years ago äs a Dissertation for the doctorate at the University of Michigan. The author writes in bis preface: "I have undertaken to Interpret the metaphysical notes in Berkeley's Öommonplace Book, and äs far äs possible discover the Principle of Unity which occasionally manifeste itself in Berkeley's works, and which formed a basis for a "Treatise on the Will" which Berkeley contemplated but never produced ... The principle of Unity found in Berkeley has been compared and contrasted with that of Kant". -From a consideration of the various scattered references made by Berkeley to the will (often in the form of thoughts jotted down in single sentences) the author endeavors to show that in Berkeley's conception of the Will we have a principle which may be compared with Kant's Transcendental unity of Apperception, since it furnishes not merely a principle for unitingthe individuaTs experience, but also serves to unify the individual with the world and with God. He is not, however, blind to the fact that Berkeley always looked at philosophical questions from the theological point of view, and was thus prevented from logically working out the implications of his principle. The similarities and contrasts of the two principles are stated at length in the concluding chapter. I shall quote one passage: "In summing up the points of similarity we may say the inquires of both involve the relation of seif and the World; both began with experience; both had a dualism; both sought a unity; both säw the necessity of a synthetic activity; both made this activity necessary to experience; both made the active principle thinkable but unknowable; both led us through Reason by means of a transcendent faith, into an undoubted assurance of Immortality, Freedom and God" (p. 78). Experience. Phüos. Review, VIH, 3, 4, 6, (May, July, Sept., 1899) -pp. 225-246, 337-356, 449-464. - The articles under the above titles continue the treatment of Kant begun in the author's previously published papers, "Kant's Critical Problem", and "The Genesis of the Critical Philosophy". They constitute a somewhat detailed exposition and criticism of the first two main divisions of the Kr. d. r. V. -the Aesthetic and Analytic. In the first of the articles under the former heading, after giving a general exposition of Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic, and pointing out the motives which led Kant to adopt the subjective view of space and time (among which he emphasizes the theological motive), the author first considers in detail the treatment of time. He maintains thatKant has faüed to establish the existence of any a priori science of time, which might be paralleled with geometry äs the science of space, and that the propositions which he adduces in this connection are nierely analytic. He then examines Kant's arguments to prove that time is a necessary a priori perception, and concludes that they are all inadequate. Further, while admitting that the knowledge of time is conditioned by the nature of consciousness, Schurman refuses to acknowledge that time is nothing but a subjective form, and also denies the phenomenalism which Kant based upon that doctrine. "Kant rightly saw that time was subjective. Bus inference that we can know nothing about the real world rests not on that subjectivity, but on the treatment of time äs a universal form, furnished by the mind alone, for the reception of matter given from without. Considered äs a subjective possession, apart from the doctrine of form and matter, time really warrants certain inferences regarding the external world äs objective ground of its own origination". -The treatment of space in the second article follows simüar lines. Kant's arguments are rejected, and the possibility of an empirical theory of space founded on the 'extensity'Of sensations is maintained. Finally, it is shown that the fundamental propositions of geometry do not rest upon any a priori perception, but upon ordinary perceptive experience. -In the final paper of the second series, after examining Kant's deduction of the categories, and the transcendental Schema, Schurman gives a summary of his results from which I quote some sentences: 1) "There can be no doubt that the unity of seif-consciousness is the supreme condition of all experience". 2) "There is no knowledge or experience without a synthesis of perceptions, which, äs Kant rightly saw, is dependent upon the original unity of self-consciousness". 3) "The synthesis of experience being dependent upon several conditions, we can determine what the functions of self-consciousness in its production may be, if at all, only by reflection on experience and elimination of all other conditions". 4) "The functions of self-consciousness, along with the other conditions of synthesis in experience, must be accepted äs ultimate facts. . . . From Kant's own higher point of view of the categories äs activities
II. Articles.
or functions of the understanding, and not raere notions (even though a priori), there is no sense in tbe problem of Kant's transcendental deduction at all". 6) "There is nothing absolutely universal and necessary in experience. ... As experience must be accepted äs it is givcn, though it may be dissected into its elements, so tbe causal relation in experience has no other claim to validity than the fact that it is given. Its dignity, its universality and necessity, its a priori origin in the understanding, are all surviving fictions of rationalism". 6) "There is no proof that the twelve categories represent the fonctions of judging". 7) "What Kant offers äs a priori knowledge of nature has turned out . . . to be mere tautology, or generalization from experience". 8) "The schematism of the categories . . . has no raison d'ttre except Kant's arbitrary (though historically conditioned) Opposition of sense and understanding. In principle, the schematism is really rendered unnecessary by the conception of the categories äs functions of the mind, rather than äs notions in it". -The author then proceeds to examine and reject, in favor of an empirical view, Kant's theory of substantiality and of causality, and concludes that of the whole Analytic "there now remains, äs sole imraortal principle, the unity of selfconsciousness äs supreme condition of all thought and knowledge". Perry, K. B. The Abstract Freedom of Kant. Philos. Keview, IX, 6, pp, 630-647. The author of this paper has already furnished a summary of its contents to this Journal (Bd. VI, l, pp. 95-96).
F. Jodl, Goethe and Kant. Monist, XI, 2, pp. 258-266. This paper is written in close relation to and dependence on Vorländer's articles in the Kantstudien on Goethe's relation to Kant. After acknowledging the meritorious nature of Vorländer's investigation, Jodl remarks: Vorländer, who is a pronounced neo-Kantian, may perhaps in the Interpretation of bis abundant material "Kantise" too much occasionally, and this will rather justify the attempt of the present paper not only to present the most important conclusions of bis treatise, but also to emphasize the profound difference in their 'conceptions of the universe which separates Goethe and Kant, despite all that they have incidentallyincommon: an Opposition which has lost neither its keenness nor its significance in the philosophic thought of today" (p. 260). -In fulfillment of this purpose, the author, in the first place, gives an account of what is now known regarding Goethe's interest in the Kantian philosophy and bis occupation with it. He then . points out the fundamental differences between Kant and Goethe. Kant's dualism of a sensuous and a spiritual world, together with bis limitation of knowledge to phenomena, is wholly foreign to Goethe. The latter is firmly convinced of "the objective and not merely subjective reality of the world that appears to our senses. In its totality it is an infinite problem for our cognition; but not because our cognition can nowhere attain to reality, but because the reality in the multiplicity and complexity of its processes everywhere exceeds the grasp of our finite thought". It was not Kant's critical standpoint which Goethe adopted, but rather the constructive -the thought which Kant throws out in the Kritik der Urteilskraft of the possibility of a unity of the teleological and mechanical aspects of nature.
